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War is always a messy business. It brings in its wake, a tremendous 
amount of death, destruction and devastation. In an idealistic world, 
one would banish war for good. However, we live in an imperfect world 
wherein human egos, greed, power, religion, revenge, etc. have a major 
role to play in shaping the environment. This ushers in the inevitability 
of war as the final arbiter in deciding which way the world should move 
at a particular point of time in history. We are also aware, of course, 
that history has a way of repeating itself, thus, underlining the frailty of 
the human mind in repeatedly falling prey to the same mistakes and not 
learning much from the past.
Warfare is perpetually evolving. From ancient times, when foot 
soldiers held sway with swords, spears, bows and arrows, and used forts 
and obstacles for effective defence, it moved to the use of elephants and 
horses to provide enhanced mobility and raised platforms for dominating 
the foot soldier. Introduction of dynamite brought about a revolutionary 
change in the concept, methodology, conduct and execution of warfare. 
A similar effect was created when the tank, followed by the aircraft, 
entered the battlefield. A study of the two World Wars fought in the 
20th century clearly brings out how rapid changes in mobility, lethality, 
General Deepak Kapoor (Retd) is former Chief of India’s Army Staff.
2  CLAWS Journal l Winter 2018
battlefield transparency and precision affected the very methodology 
of the conduct of warfare from one to the other, thus, dictating the 
outcomes. Of course, use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
added a dimension, the consequences of which have threatened the very 
existence of mankind.
Unfortunately, the advent of nuclear weapons has not stopped the 
evolution of warfare. We are now delving into Artificial Intelligence (AI), 
robotics, cyber and space warfare to achieve victories in conflicts, with 
maximum destruction to the adversary and least own casualties, while 
remaining below the nuclear threshold. Thus, while the devastating 
potential of nuclear weapons is well acknowledged, the attempt is to win 
wars in the backdrop of a nuclear holocaust while continuing to remain 
within the conventional threshold.
Most strategists adopt previous wars as models to predict the future 
environment of warfare which then becomes the basis for developing 
force capabilities for the future. While this approach is logical and has 
worked reasonably well in the past, the changes currently taking place in 
areas which have a bearing on the future battlefield environment are so 
cataclysmic and huge that an incremental approach to future war-fighting 
is hardly likely to succeed. These changes require out of the box thinking, 
not necessarily in sequential order, to throw up innovative solutions 
which would then lead to success. Therefore, it would only be right to 
first study the future battlefield environment, successively followed by the 
role and future of land warfare.
Future Battlefield Environment
Unlike in the past, a future battlefield is likely to be non-linear in nature 
wherein neither the front nor the rear would be clearly defined. Actions 
undertaken at a strategic level may have a direct bearing on battles being 
fought at the tactical level and vice versa. It would be a multi-dimensional 
battlefield, employing physical, economic, psychological, cyber, space and 
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information warfare domains simultaneously to impact the outcome of a 
conflict on an adversary. 
The attempt would be to demoralise the adversary and break his will 
to fight. The United States (US) executed such a strategy during the 
Iraq War with considerable success. However, while this strategy worked 
against an established regime in an all out war, wherein all the above 
domains could be freely used, it may not work when operating within 
restrictions and constraints in limited wars. Thus, when the US had to 
undertake counter-insurgency warfare operations against the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, the success was minimal as the fighting was way below 
the conventional level, restricting the US’ ability to optimally employ all 
components to achieve the desired success. 
Similarly, Sun Zi advocated winning wars without firing a round. This 
is done by the use of diplomatic, economic, military, psychological and 
informational domains to pressurise the adversary.1 Currently, China seems 
to be achieving its objectives in the South China Sea in relation to its disputes 
with its smaller neighbours by pursuing this strategy, thus, strengthening 
its stranglehold in the region. Likewise, China has also violated the United 
Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS) as well as 
decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In this perspective, for a comprehensive understanding of the future 
battlefield environment, it becomes imperative to analyse the different 
components that would constitute it and have a decisive impact on the 
outcome of the conflict.
Battlefield Transparency
It is a well-known fact that the greater the knowledge about the 
adversary, his dispositions and capabilities, the higher the chances of 
success in a conflict. In view of this, use of satellites, Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs), drones, etc. has resulted in providing total battlefield 
transparency on a real-time basis. It helps in breaching the adversary’s 
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secrecy and enhances knowledge about his activities, their pattern as well 
as the future course of action he is likely to adopt. This knowledge is 
invaluable in preempting his actions and taking suitable steps to thwart 
his plans and defeat him in detail.
The depth and range of battlefield transparency would vary 
depending on the level at which an operation has to be executed. Thus, 
while for a company or battalion level operation, transparency of up to 
10-15 km may suffice, at the brigade and higher levels, the depth of 
transparency requirement is likely to successively shift from the tactical to 
the strategic domain, going up to 100 km and beyond. This transparency 
has, of course, to be shared across the horizontal spectrum besides the 
vertical one since operations in one sector may have a bearing on other 
neighbouring sectors. 
With the vast number of means available to achieve battlefield 
transparency, the danger is of surfeit of information gathered not getting 
systematically collected, collated and analysed, thus, defeating the 
objective. It is, therefore, important to have a trained organisation to shift 
through the plethora of data gathered in order to arrive at meaningful 
results which can be communicated in real-time for decisive action.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
In a future battlefield environment, AI is likely to play a major role for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it would help in reducing human casualties by 
virtue of being used to carry out tasks generally assigned to humans in a 
battlefield. Secondly, intelligence programmed in the machines is likely to 
be much faster and more precise in a set of given situations, thus, achieving 
results on a real-time basis. Thirdly, the ability to analyse complex options 
based on specified inputs is likely to be higher than that of average human 
beings. Of course, unpredictable and unforeseen situations would always 
remain the preserve of the human mind but a majority of such situations 
in a battlefield fall in the predictable pattern, enabling use of AI. Fourthly, 
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AI does away with emotions like fear, stress, tension, fatigue, response to 
injury, etc. whose effect can lead to adverse outcomes in a battlefield. It 
concentrates on rational decision-making. 
As the frontiers of science expand wider and deeper, the potential of 
exploiting AI is increasing tremendously. Combined with robotics, AI is 
headed towards virtually removing the human being from the battlefield. 
The US is already experimenting with ocean-going drones in the form 
of mini human-less ships hunting for hostile submarines and destroying 
them.
Research is also ongoing in the field of autonomous weapons. Once 
fully developed, these weapons will be programmed to identify the enemy 
through the maze of the battle, target him and use precision munitions 
to destroy him whether during day or night. Use of driver-less fighting 
vehicles in the battlefield is also inching gradually towards reality. With 
such revolutionary changes on the horizon, transformation in the 
methodology and conduct of warfare is bound to take place.
Purely from an ethical perspective, there is a serious debate on 
whether AI should be used at all during war. In a 2018 survey carried 
out by the Brookings Institution, it was found that just 30 per cent of 
the adult internet users felt AI should be developed for warfare, while 
39 per cent negated its use, with the balance being unsure.2 However, if 
adversaries were already developing such weapons, then 45 per cent felt 
that the US too should do it while 25 per cent still felt that it would be 
ethically wrong to use AI during war.3 However, notwithstanding the 
debate, if it gives a distinct advantage in the battlefield by its use, there is 
no doubt that AI would be put to use by both sides.
Cyber Warfare
Cyber warfare is the use and targeting of computers, online control 
systems and networks in warfare. It involves both defensive and offensive 
operations. Today, most modern militaries are becoming increasingly 
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dependent on computers since these have tremendous applications in 
almost all aspects of warfare. Vulnerability of computers and networks to 
cyber attacks has opened up the whole new field of cyber warfare. Russia, 
China, Iran and North Korea are way ahead of the others in this field.
The command and control chain from the lowest to the highest levels, 
inclusive of tactical as well as strategic operations, is controlled through 
networks and communications engineered with painstaking efforts. The 
best of military plans need efficient systems for passage and execution 
of directions/orders to achieve success at the ground level. Breach or 
hacking of control systems and networks can wreak havoc due to loss 
of security or blackout of directions at crucial periods during ongoing 
operations, resulting in possible failure.
 In a future battlefield environment, increasing use of cyber warfare 
will bestow its practitioners with tremendous gains, far out of proportion 
with the efforts employed. No wonder, most militaries are working 
towards ensuring efficient use of their own networks and systems while, at 
the same time, degrading the adversary’s and rendering them ineffective.
Space Warfare
In a broad understanding, militarisation of space is understood as the 
placement and development of weaponry and military technology in 
outer space. For instance, the early exploitation of space in the mid-20th 
century had a military motivation, given that the US and Soviet Union 
used it as an opportunity to demonstrate ballistic missile technology and 
other technologies having the potential for military application.4
It remains indisputable that space is the next dimension that would 
be added to the complex and dangerous battlefield environment of the 
future. China, Russia and the US are all taking steps that will ultimately 
result in weaponisation of space. North Korea launched two satellites in 
2012 and 2016 that can threaten the US by guiding its Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to attack the US with an Electro-Magnetic 
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Pulse (EMP) as part of a larger surprise assault aimed at crippling the 
US military. The North Korean satellites that orbit over the US are 
on trajectories consistent with surprise EMP attack—with one of 
the two satellites always in orbit directly over the US at any point in 
time. An EMP attack could severely disrupt America’s electricity grid, 
telecommunications, transportation network and other forms of critical 
infrastructure. China sees space warfare as its best chance to compete 
with the US militarily, since it has no blue water Navy, nor anywhere near 
the assets and firepower capability that the US military has. Rather than 
trying to match the US military and Air Force, China believes it can gain 
an advantage by effective use of space through production of specialised 
missiles, spacecraft and platforms.5 
What advantages do space-based weapons provide to a nation? 
Firstly, use of directed energy e.g. laser, radio frequency, etc. from 
space enables destruction of an adversary’s ballistic missiles, hostile 
aircraft, susceptible sensors and communication links and space-based 
satellites. Secondly, space-based weapons provide an additional option, 
which in certain time critical situations may be the only option to take 
on an adversary’s hostile weaponry and destroy it. Thirdly, keeping 
in mind the battlefield environment, weapon delivery at the intended 
targets can be risk-prone and problematic, resulting in a higher failure 
rate. Space-based weapons provide relatively more secure and sure 
means of striking. Lastly, space-based weapons act like a bolt from 
the blue, thus, achieving much higher destruction as compared to any 
other vector. Of course, the effectiveness and destructive potential of 
space-based weapons will vary, depending on the weather conditions 
prevailing. Thus, atmospheric targets would be more susceptible 
to directed energy weapons in clear weather and air targets more 
vulnerable to energy that can be delivered at wavelengths able to 
propagate through the weather. 
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Jointness
Jointness is the integration of the strengths of the different Services of the 
military towards achieving a common goal. It enables development and 
execution of integrated operations by optimally using available resources 
and ensuring achievement of objectives in the shortest time. Today, it is 
accepted and practised as an essential for success.
Jointness is also compatible with network-centric warfare. Besides 
that, ideal utilisation of the cyber and space warfare domains is only 
possible in a joint and integrated scenario wherein the benefits would be 
shared across the inter-Service spectrum. 
Jointness is intra-military in character and is a means that any good 
higher command organisation must seek to achieve. In its wake, it brings 
in synergy, optimum use, professionalism, economy of resources and a 
focussed approach. It avoids duplication and enables better exploitation 
of fleeting opportunities that so often present themselves in fluid battles. 
No wonder then that most modern militaries, including those of the 
US, Russia and China, have shifted to the Theatre Command concept 
wherein the resources of all the Services are placed at the disposal of the 
Theatre Commander to accomplish the tasks assigned. It increases the 
options available to the Theatre Commander to succeed. Unfortunately, 
the Indian military is still prevaricating on the degree of jointness to be 
achieved, with the three Services trying to protect their individual turfs. 
In the long run, this delay in operating in an integrated manner is likely 
to cost us heavily. 
Precision Targeting
With the advent of lasers, radio waves, EMP, shoot and scoot capabilities, 
etc. precision targeting is likely to be the norm in the future. While 
battlefield transparency enables recognition and pin-pointing of specific 
targets, precision targeting ensures its total exploitation. It avoids 
collateral damage and concentrates on specifically destroying potential 
DEEPAK KAPOOR
CLAWS Journal l Winter 2018 9
threats. More importantly, it achieves a tremendous psychological 
advantage over an adversary since his vulnerability gets highlighted and 
he stands demoralised.
Wither Land Warfare?
The idea of nation-states incorporates the concepts of territorial integrity, 
land borders and sovereignty. We are as yet too far away from Wendell 
Willkie’s “One World”6 articulation. Any violation of the concept would 
be deeply contested at every step, by all means available to the affected 
nation-state. Thus, warfare is here to stay till as long as nation-states exist. 
In fact, it is the ultimate means of resolving disputes between nations 
when all other options have failed.
The notion of land warfare is an inherent and inalienable part of the 
overall concept of warfare. The fact that almost 75 per cent of the world’s 
current militaries are ground forces, points to land warfare playing a 
predominant role in conflicts in the foreseeable future. To quote, Michael 
O’Hanlon posits that “modern war is becoming increasingly lethal and, 
thus, unforgiving to the unprepared, but it is not making ground combat 
irrelevant or obsolete”.7 It is the land domain, as compared to other domains 
of warfare like cyber, space, maritime and air that produces tangible and 
quantifiable results during conflicts. To which, David E. Johnson argues 
that the nature of the enemy and his will to continue fighting often can 
be countered and defeated only by ground forces, given that protracted 
air operations can be costly, with diminishing returns, while naval power 
has little effect to overturn enemy seizure or control of land, which also 
applies to cyber and space.8 In view of this, the principal opportunity that 
land forces offer is the ability to impose a decision on adversaries that 
the other domains cannot: taking and holding ground, destroying enemy 
forces in detail and controlling and protecting populations.9 Emphasising 
the importance of ground forces, Gen Mark Milley, the US Army Chief 
of Staff, in his address on June 23, 2016, at the Centre for Strategic and 
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International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., categorically stated: 
“I think we are on the cusp of a fundamental change in the character 
of ground warfare. It will be of such significance that it will be like 
the rifling of a musket or the introduction of a machine gun or it will 
have such significance impact as the change from horse to mechanized 
vehicles”.10 
However, the terrain over which the land forces have to operate can 
add to complexity and operational friction manifold. Thus, the terrain 
may vary from plain to riverine to desert to hilly or mountainous, making 
appropriate planning imperative for achieving success. Additionally, 
prevailing weather conditions also have a bearing on the outcome. To 
note, operations in Afghanistan, both now and during the occupation by 
the Soviet Union, show the effects of complex terrain. In view of this, the 
absence of roads and mountainous terrain make helicopters important 
in movement of forces, medical evacuation and resupply. However, the 
weather and terrain also make flying helicopters much more difficult than 
in Iraq.11
Science and technology are constantly being refined to achieve victory 
with more sophisticated weapons in the shortest possible time, with the 
least number of casualties. In fact, the concept of achieving victory by 
the use of air power and missiles, without committing soldiers on the 
ground, was tried by the US in the initial stages of the attack on Iraq. 
However, realisation that victory would not be possible without ‘boots 
on the ground’ soon dawned, leading to a subsequent change in the 
strategy and ultimate victory. In Afghanistan too, somewhat the same 
pattern was followed. 
Of late, as witnessed in the case of the South China Sea, China is 
engaged in transforming the small islands and reefs into full-fledged 
military bases with a view to bolster its claims against other Southeast 
Asian nations. Such actions are also likely to be undertaken by other 
countries in the Arctic region in the foreseeable future. Although this 
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extends the spectrum of conflict to the oceans, ground/marine forces will 
still have a dominant role to play in deciding the outcome since physical 
occupation would be involved.
Threat Analysis
Three different types of threats, singly or all together, will manifest 
themselves in the future and would have to be tackled by the military. 
This can be explained in the following:
Non-State Adversaries
More popularly described as terrorists, this group is characterised by the 
philosophy of wanting the world to dance to their tune by indulging in 
acts of death and destruction inimical to mankind. Working individually 
or in groups, they do not enjoy formal approval of nations of the world 
for their actions. 
They threaten to terrorise the world into submission and acceptance 
of their demands like ransom, release of prisoners, regime change, etc. 
while working individually or in small groups. In larger groups, they 
seek to impose a new world order. Thus, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State (IS), 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), etc. fall into this category.
A number of states covertly use such groups to achieve their 
ulterior designs while professing ignorance about their existence. Thus, 
the terrorist strike in Mumbai on 26/11, wherein LeT terrorists who 
attacked a number of installations, causing massive death and destruction, 
were clandestinely trained, equipped and inserted through the Arabian 
Sea with covert Pakistani support is a recent example. Despite concrete 
evidence to the contrary, Pakistan has steadfastly refused to accept its 
complicity in the Mumbai attack.
State Sponsored Hybrid Adversaries
These are threats posed by forces unleashed by an adversarial state. All 
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support in terms of planning, training, preparing and inserting hybrid 
adversaries is provided by the inimical state. Hezbollah in the Middle 
East, separatists in Crimea and jihadists in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) 
are current examples wherein Iran, Russia and Pakistan respectively have 
provided support.
These hybrid adversaries, at the behest of the sponsoring state, 
work towards regime destabilisation, regime change or altering existing 
land boundaries. Their degree of success would vary depending on the 
resources available and the extent of popular support enjoyed by them. 
Their modus operandi is to target government institutions and policies 
and create conditions of unrest and uprising among the populace.
State Adversaries
When two states have major differences which cannot be resolved by all 
other available means, war is the ultimate option. While remaining below 
the nuclear threshold, they often take recourse to conventional war to 
settle differences, as exemplified in cases such as the Arab-Israeli conflicts, 
Indo-Pakistan Wars and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.
In a future threat scenario, conventional war would be combined 
with the use of non-state adversaries as well as state sponsored hybrid 
adversaries to achieve rapid success. Simultaneous attacks from multiple 
directions targeting not only frontline soldiers but also rear and 
administrative echelons are likely to confuse and demoralise the adversary, 
ensuring his defeat in detail. This methodology is currently being applied 
in both Syria and Yemen. 
Organisational Changes
With the battlefield environment and nature of land warfare undergoing 
major changes, it is imperative that organisational transformation takes 
place in sync with those changes to fight more effectively and efficiently. 
Integrated task oriented battle groups would be the norm rather than 
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large division sized formations of World War II mould. Special operations 
teams to carry out specific tasks for mission accomplishment would 
form an integral part of the battle groups. Airborne forces, capable of 
quick insertion into the battle zone to ward off a crisis or exploit fleeting 
opportunities need to be planned for. Here, shifting of forces from one 
theatre to another at short notice becomes especially relevant in the case 
of limited force levels or in the contingency of having to face a two-front 
threat. Acquisition of the requisite air transport lift capability for such an 
eventuality is imperative.
There should always be an effort to improve the ‘teeth to tail’ ratio 
wherein the logistic tail is reduced to the minimum essential while 
enhancing the fighting potential of the force. Thus, restructuring of the 
available force levels to achieve optimum results must be an ongoing 
process with changes in the organisation brought in on an as required basis. 
The US carried out specific organisational changes to meet the demands 
of the counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, notwithstanding its 
ultimate failure which is attributable to a number of other factors. 
Land Warfare in the Indian Context
Since India became independent in 1947, it has had to fight a series 
of wars till date to maintain its territorial integrity, as noted in its wars 
against Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999. In 1947-48 and 
1965, Pakistan tried its best to wrest J&K by force by sending in irregular 
and regular forces. In fact, in 1965, the conflict took place all along the 
Indo-Pakistan border besides J&K. Both times, it was roundly defeated 
by the Indian military.
In 1971, Pakistan rode roughshod over the electoral results wherein 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League party of then East Pakistan 
had won an absolute majority in the Pakistan National Assembly. It jailed 
Sheikh Mujib and to quell the protests which erupted as a result, sent 
in the Army which indulged in massive plunder, rape and large scale 
FUTURE OF LAND WARFARE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
14  CLAWS Journal l Winter 2018
atrocities on the hapless population. There was worldwide condemnation 
of the Pakistan Army’s reprehensible actions. Sheikh Mujib declared 
unilateral independence of the new entity, Bangladesh. India supported 
Bangladesh which resulted in an all out war with Pakistan. In one of the 
finest chapters in Indian military history, India achieved a huge victory, 
taking over 93,000 soldiers as prisoners while liberating Bangladesh.
In a clandestine operation, Pakistan attempted to capture Kargil and 
its surrounding heights in J&K in 1999 with the aim of severing Ladakh 
from the rest of the state. This attempt too was thwarted in a befitting 
manner, with the bold actions of the Indian Army and Air Force. Pakistan 
was forced to withdraw with huge losses.
While against the Chinese, India’s ill-equipped Army lost heavily 
in 1962. However, in subsequent skirmishes at Nathula in 1967 and 
Wangdung in 1986, it gave an excellent account of itself. In fact, despite 
an active and tense border, with frequent Chinese transgressions, the 
Indian Army has been able to keep the territorial integrity of the country 
intact.
In addition, serious insurgent situations in a number of northeastern 
states in the second half of the 20th century, aided and abetted by our 
not too friendly neighbours, kept the Army on its toes. Commencement 
of insurgency in J&K with Pakistan’s active support since 1989 and its 
containment has further added to the Army’s responsibilities. 
It would be clear from the above that for the past 70 years, land warfare 
has dominated the Indian subcontinent. This trend is likely to continue in 
the foreseeable future. With two recalcitrant neighbours and an unsettled 
land border of over 7,000 km, the threat of a two-front war looms large 
over India’s horizon. Concomitant with the ongoing insurgencies in J&K 
and parts of northeast India, the Indian Army certainly has its plate full 
with commitments. 
In this context, the moot question that arises is: what should be done 
to meet the challenges of the future? A number of issues have already 
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been discussed in the earlier part of this paper. Some major aspects, 
including those requiring reiteration, are covered below to enable the 
Indian military to develop capabilities for performing its tasks creditably 
in a future battlefield scenario.
Defence Budget
In an era when all modern countries are spending or are increasing their 
defence expenditure to over 2 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), in India we have seen a declining trend for the past 8-10 years. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) nations are all working 
towards spending 2 per cent by 2024. In fact, President Trump is nudging 
them towards spending 4 per cent post 2024. Both China and Pakistan, 
our problematic neighbours, are spending over 3 per cent. On the other 
hand, during the last 10 years, the Indian defence budget has been 
gradually coming down from 2 per cent to 1.57 per cent in the current 
financial year. The Indian defence community has been clamouring for 
3 percent defence budget for a long time. As the Parliamentary Defence 
Committee headed by Gen B. C. Khanduri (Retd) pointed out in its 
report in March 2018, 68 per cent of the equipment held by the Indian 
Army is obsolete. While that may have resulted in his being replaced as 
the Chairman of the committee, it nevertheless points to a serious danger 
to national security in the long run. The sooner we rectify the situation, 
the better.
Theatre Commands and Jointness 
We have paid lip-service to jointness so far for all the wrong reasons 
like turf protection, Service loyalties, bureaucratic manipulation, lack of 
expert domain knowledge in employing other Services, etc. Unless there 
is an attitudinal change among the three Services towards integration, 
we are laying ourselves bare to defeat in detail in a future conflict. We 
can take solace from the fact that the history of integration in all modern 
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militaries throws up challenges like resistance to change, fear of being 
swamped by a larger Service, obstacles to individual Service growth, 
etc. The difference is that while most others have overcome apathy and 
resistance and gone ahead with integration, we, in India, continue to 
flounder in unnecessary debate and discussion. Promotion of jointness, 
and closer integration among the three Services is a strategic necessity. We 
need to create Theatre Commands, with resources pooled from all the 
Services to accomplish assigned missions during operations. Employment 
of all arms and Services by the Theatre Commander in a befitting manner 
to achieve optimum results will eventually happen only if we work at it 
from now on. Likewise, integration of Service Headquarters with the 
Ministry of Defence is imperative to undertake and implement national 
security issues in a more rational manner. 
Higher Defence Organisation
A single point adviser to the Government of India on matters of defence 
and national security was first recommended by a committee of a Group 
of Ministers headed by the then Home Minister, Shri L. K. Advani, 
after the Kargil conflict. This was approved by the Cabinet under the 
leadership of Mr Vajpayee in 2001. However, 17 years down the line, we 
have still not implemented it. For informed decision-making in defence 
matters, the requirement of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is imperative, 
especially when the political hierarchy as well as the bureaucracy have only 
limited/ negligible expertise on these matters. Additionally, structured 
institutionalised interaction between the Service Chiefs and the political 
hierarchy needs to be laid down in the interest of national security. The 
current practice of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) summoning 
the chief only in times of crisis is hardly satisfactory. Perhaps, the crisis 
would not occur if regular interaction is in place.
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Infrastructure Development
With unsettled disputes with our two neighbours China and Pakistan, 
the need to have good infrastructure to fight a successful defensive 
battle on two fronts can hardly be overemphasised. A number of our 
sensitive areas in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand and J&K are 
dependent on one single, tenuous road link even today, 70 years since 
independence. This makes logistics and sustenance as well reinforcement 
of forces on the front problematic. The situation gets worse if this single 
lifeline gets disrupted due to enemy action or natural disasters. The 
Chinese have created excellent infrastructure in Tibet in a much shorter 
timeframe. Lack of resources, environmental clearances, land acquisition, 
bureaucratic delays, etc. cannot be justifiable reasons for putting the 
territorial integrity of the nation in jeopardy. We need to take urgent steps 
to create suitable infrastructure in the forward areas to enable our soldiers 
to acquit themselves well in the face of aggression. 
Finally, irrespective of the changes envisaged in the future battlefield 
environment, land warfare will continue to dominate conflicts between 
nations in the foreseeable future. This assertion is more pertinent in 
India’s case since we have unresolved borders with two of our neighbours. 
It would, therefore, be important for us to always be prepared to face a 
two-front threat in our national security interest.
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